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Abstract
Since around 1970, academic studies on decision-making have changed in 
nature. Whereas they used to be laboratory studies of selected situations giving rise 
to the expression of individual choices, nowadays studies focus on real situations. 
These situations are processed in their natural contexts at the time they occur. The 
decisions to be made concern generally social problems (for instance forest fires, 
maritime pollution or global warming). This mutation in the nature of situations 
studied requires a paradigm shift, which leads to elaborate decisions in complex, 
dynamic and evolving systems, even sometimes resilient to human actions imple-
mented to control them. This chapter analyses, at individual and group level (crisis 
units), cognitive difficulties encountered by decision-makers in handling such 
situations. These situations consist in treating information by assigning them, from 
the outset, meanings (sometimes personal). This is done by looking for temporary 
interactions, while respecting the global nature of the situation, by focusing on 
knowing the properties of context as well as those of the temporal evolution of 
the system concerned. This chapter analyses a case study for which urgent and 
fundamental decisions could not be taken and proposes an interpretation in terms 
of paradigms. Previous studies noted that the decision in complex systems, could 
entail paradoxes. This study on the decision-making dynamic shows that seeking 
objectivity, as defined under its current intangible form, does not produce a signifi-
cant increase in the validity of choices made.
Keywords: Decision-making, Complexity, Dynamism, Systems, Holism, Paradigm
1. Introduction
Since psychology has set as its main purpose the study of behaviour, decision-
making behaviour represents a stimulating subject for studies and research. Not 
only are there numerous circumstances in which it proves necessary to make a 
choice, but they are also highly varied. This chapter analyses a quite specific cat-
egory of decisions: those concerning the action choices in complex and dynamic 
systems. Highly different from other decisions studied in fixed environments, 
Decision Making
2
they lead us to explore the field of epistemology and cognitive psychology and offer 
the advantage of generating sensitive crossed interrogations in these two disciplines 
also required for the construction of knowledge.
This chapter will focus on one of these, in other words the relations between the 
choice of an objective epistemology and the absence, observed in the field, of relevant 
decisions. The argument has seven facets. The first describes the cognitive and epis-
temological specificities of decision-making in complex and dynamic systems. The 
second deals with the assignment of meaning to information, while the third describes 
a selection of real situations which led to decision-making difficulties. The fourth facet 
is dedicated to the examination of an investigation tool: the paradigm, and refers to a 
particular paradigm; the objective experimental paradigm (OEP) which underlies sci-
entific progress in numerous disciplines. The fifth facet focuses on its transferability to 
decision-making in complex and dynamic systems and any resulting cognitive dilem-
mas. The sixth facet raises the question of the globality of the situations to be processed 
(rather than their breakdown into variables) by taking as guideline an attempt made 
to this effect in psychology. The seventh examines the epistemological position of the 
decision-makers faced with a paradox which seems to be related to valorisation at all 
costs of objectivation, at the expense of other characteristics of the decision.
2. Decision-making aimed at cognitive psychology
2.1 A decision-making proto-schema
The most concise characterisation of decision-making facing with uncertainty 
[1] consists in describing it as an approach prior to choosing one action [Ai] 
amongst a set of n actions [An] considered as being potentially relevant. In this 
characterisation, decision-making consists in generating what psychologists call 
a conduct (a behaviour in common language) in order to choose the action [Ai] 
amongst a set of n possible actions. This action is evaluated as being the most rel-
evant to change an existing situation considered to be inappropriate or dangerous. 
For example: which action(s) should be chosen to stop the persistent financial losses 
of a company? However, the cognitive approach is not solely interested in the end 
result (the chosen action); it attempts to explain the characteristics which led to this 
conclusion. These characteristics must be found in the information present in the 
situation and with respect to the objective to be reached. The theoretical references 
used will therefore concern cognitive psychology, whose purpose is to study how to 
process the information which will lead to a judgement, then to a decision.
2.2 Decision-making as cognitive management of systems and networks
It can be observed that, in this conception, decision-making is not limited to 
initially selecting outcomes to create the set n and to making a limited number 
of binary comparisons. This type of limitation would exclude from the field of 
the decision any “surprise” which could arise from the reality of the situation 
processed. We will then observe that the informational characteristics of the 
environment and even more its ability to evolve, are largely or totally absent from 
this approach. While the condition that the set of n actions must be exhaustive is 
initially put forward, it is not always possible to meet this condition. All operational 
decision-makers are aware of the frequency of unexpected or unforeseen conditions 
in the initial plan [2]. Mental fixism, which consists in thinking that “everything is 
under control” and that everything has been planned, is often accepted too readily 
due to the sole fact that it confirms an earlier mental representation.
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This type of difficulty is frequently encountered in situations where behavioural 
automation is important, for example when piloting an aircraft. While it undoubt-
edly reduces the mental effort, automation may nevertheless prove to be discon-
certing faced with unplanned situations, especially if the level of concentration 
drops temporarily. Amongst the causes mentioned during “inappropriate decision-
making”, analysts estimate that “airline pilots do not receive sufficient training on 
manual piloting”.
2.3 Epistemological characteristics of the chosen action
The chosen action [A1], also referred to as the dominant action, is that which, 
at the end of the decision-making process, is the one most likely to achieve the 
required effect. This first requirement applies to all decisions to define the objective 
to be reached but involves specificities in decisions qualified as complex. In such 
contexts, deciding is much more than choosing a subject or a procedure. Based on 
the dynamics of the systems concerned, we must consider that the decisions are 
taken to cause state changes in order to set up new operating balances in the systems: 
the health system, the economic system, the company, the emergency systems, etc.
Except in special cases, to obtain these state changes, the “decision” entity must 
itself be composite, i.e. must consist of a set of elementary actions (a1, a2, … ak), 
where each individual action has an impact on the system and where the set of 
actions taken together forms a global action module. The decision as such is the 
equivalent of a vector.
Scientific knowledge requires that the epistemological characteristics of the 
chosen informations must be clearly defined. The most obvious are the validity (v), 
the generality (g) and the fidelity (f). The sequence of elementary actions must 
prove that it is composed in such a way that it can act on the system in the required 
direction (v), do so for all situations of the same type (g), with a stability of effect 
which is repeated over time (f). These qualities can be used to distinguish the daily 
information forming know-how from the scientific information which satisfied 
these requirements, substrate on which the theoretical systems are built.
3. Information, cognition, and assignment of meaning
3.1 Perception and interpretation
In the press and in the media, the discriminating power of the sensory func-
tions is largely overestimated. Taking vision for example, the eye, compared with 
a camera, which would record events, is supposed to provide a faithful image of 
the external context sometimes called reality. However, the information that we 
will use to build an adapted our conduct is necessarily obtained by interpretation. 
It consists of dynamic entities to which meanings are assigned due to the mere fact 
they have transited via the neural networks of the brain. The retinal image there-
fore acquires, in the brain, a meaning related to the decision-maker’s knowledge 
networks.
3.2 Two cognition modules (levels)
Decision-making thus appears as a mental task involving two different but 
complementary types of operation corresponding to two cognition levels, each one 
representing a homogeneous subset of operations and therefore deserving to be 
considered as a module.
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3.2.1 The information sampling process (module 1)
The first cognitive operations consist in collecting information by performing a 
global inspection of the situation; the subsequent operations, carried out in succes-
sive steps, will then reduce the field explored.
All human-decision-makes absorb the situation to be processed using data 
supplied by their sensory functions. Two important points must nevertheless be 
specified. Firstly, the term “sensory functions” must be understood in a very broad 
sense not restricted to the well-known five senses but also including all the recep-
tors involving movement, sensitivity and possibly intuition. The range of informa-
tion available therefore extends far beyond the data processed in the specific areas 
traditionally mentioned. Secondly, we must stress, as said previously, that each 
sensory input is processed and interpreted by the brain. Apart from its physiological 
properties, we must therefore point out its main characteristic: being an element 
which brings meaning.
3.2.2 The information formatting processes (module 2)
The level-2 cognitive processes are referred to as executive functions. They 
differ from the previous functions by the fact that they regulate the scheduling 
(planning) of the behavioural construction sometimes as activation (useful infor-
mation) and sometimes as inhibition (interfering information). The main func-
tions concerned are attention, flexibility of thought, implementation of adaptive 
feedback loops, global reformulations, etc. They are involved in determining the 
behaviour at a global activation level. The most illustrative example is that of atten-
tion, which does not belong to any specific item of information but which can be 
applied to each one.
3.3 Complementarity
In line with the systemic outlooks, it is important to consider that these modules 
represent two entities which, far from being opposed, complement each other 
in numerous circumstances. It would be worthwhile considering them as induc-
ing each other mutually. Module 1 samples information in situ whereas module 2 
handles the formatting and organisation of the set so created. Module 2 is involved 
in the creation of the cognitive maps which will be described in greater detail in this 
document.
4. Epistemological characteristics of the situations studied
4.1 Structural data
To complete the data collection, it is necessary to mention a few real decision-
making situations in complex systems which occurred since about 1960. The 
situations studied by the social sciences exhibit four properties:
• complex situations which include a large number of dimensions with non-
linear relations, making it difficult to assess how the situations are going 
to evolve.
• systems organised in subsystems, not around variables. These subsystems 
represent activation “focal points” which create dynamisms.
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• evolving entities which change state over time. Time must therefore be taken 
into consideration when determining the appropriate action.
• situations which often have a strong societal dimension. In numerous contexts, 
the action choices are designed to put an end to a damaging situation by control-
ling its effects and the situation itself (for example, controlling a technological 
accident such as the Chernobyl disaster). The decisions must be made rapidly, 
under the pressure of public opinion, in a context where stress is highly present.
4.2 Field data
In natural situations, this type of characterisation applies to events which appear 
to be quite different from the outside but which are relatively similar as regards their 
underlying architecture and organisation. The media report these events regularly 
when they have harmful effects.
The events most frequently encountered are:
• Forest fires, extremely difficult to control, whose recurrence and duration 
(sometimes lasting several months) are retrospective signs of decisions that are 
hard to take. Recently in California and Australia, despite major and appro-
priate firefighting measures, the fires lasted for several weeks, even several 
months, and caused serious human and material damage.
• Marine pollution due to oil spills from tankers. Coastal areas have been pol-
luted by hydrocarbons from shipwrecks on numerous occasions. Those which 
received the most media attention, due to the scale of the damage caused, are 
remembered by the names of the oil tankers themselves. We may mention 
Amoco Cadiz (1978), Exxon Valdez (1989), Aegean Sea (1992), Erika (1999), 
Prestige (2002) and Hebei Spirit (2007).
• Global warming represents another complex and dynamic system for which 
decisions must be taken at large scale. Scientists quickly raised the alert on the 
need to “manage” the climate. The Swedish chemist Arrhenius (1859–1927) was 
the first to establish a link between energy production (coal at the time) and 
global warming. Over the next decades, however, there was such a gap between 
the perceived reality and the difficulties announced that these predictions were 
forgotten by the public opinion. More recently, a predominant political factor 
has been added to the initially scientific treatment given to this issue. Since 1995, 
the United Nations has organised in a different country every year a conference 
hosting some 185 nations. Known under the acronym COP (Conference of 
Parties), these meetings have already been held 25 times. COP 26 to be held in 
the United Kingdom in 2021 for about ten days has been postponed due to the 
Covid-19 pandemic but finally will take place, another example as disconcerting 
as the previous ones regarding the management of a complex system.
• The management of pandemics exhibits all the above-mentioned characteris-
tics of a complex system. The objective to be reached is clearly determined and 
the means to change it from its current state to the final required state consist 
in setting up a decision-making sequence. This entity, which includes an evolv-
ing time dimension, comprises a series of successive decisions, each one being 
designed to make the system evolve in the required direction. The decision is 
built one step at a time, so as to preserve what has been achieved and validated 
and to duly validate the changes introduced. Examination of the strategies 
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implemented in the countries of the European Community, federated around 
a common project, reveals, both in terms of time and structure, major differ-
ences in the way the situation is processed and the decisions made.
In all these categories (the types of situation which have just been mentioned), 
the decision-makers encounter major difficulties in managing the active systems 
not only individually but also as a committee: the collective intelligence so often 
proposed as the solution is temporarily inoperative. Some forest fires last for weeks, 
even months, damaged oil tankers continue to spill their cargoes for weeks and 
sometimes much longer, the issue of global warming proves difficult to manage, like 
the pandemic which, since the alert was raised in 2019, has not yet been controlled 
at the time this document was written.
In view of such obvious and recurrent difficulties, we must examine the meth-
ods and cognitive strategies involved in the decision-making process when faced 
with complex systems.
5. Decision-making in dynamic systems: the paradigm tool
5.1 Cognition and complex systems (reminder)
Historically, relations between cognition and complex systems have been diffi-
cult to manage. It was around the 1900s with the studies conducted by J.H. Poincaré 
(1854–1912) that the first evidence relating to a problem observed in astronomy was 
detected. It was only in the 1970s, however, probably out of despair, that the expres-
sion “chaos theory” was introduced. It was to experience a major impact in relation 
with the quasi-oxymoron characterising it. The project to theorise disorder is in fact 
the exact opposite of the deterministic conceptions on which scientific theories are 
built and based. In other words, chaos seemed to be a chance event.
When studying turbulences, Ruelle and Takens [3] indicate quite to the point 
that, beyond an apparent disorder, chaos is in fact “deterministic”, but this obser-
vation introduces a new paradigm into the scientific research activity. Today the 
complexity of the situation and the dynamics that underlie it are no longer consid-
ered to be disruptive elements but as structuring characteristics of the situation and 
can be used to find the appropriate concrete action [4].
5.2 Roles and functions of the paradigm
Very broadly characterised, a paradigm, sometimes defined as a “school of 
thought” is the combination, within a given set, of theoretical and methodologi-
cal notions with concrete cases which are compatible together so that there is no 
rupture in the approach to build a corpus of knowledge. For the last two centuries, 
the objectivity required to choose the relevant action has been related to the 
experimental method resulting in the construction of the objective experimental 
paradigm (OEP) which has witnessed major successes. OEP has led to the develop-
ment of physical sciences, material sciences, life and health sciences. This paradigm 
underlies experimental medicine, as well as the progress made in the techniques 
which have accelerated its development.
5.3 Objective experimental paradigm and psychology
While the formalised sciences (virtually) never raise the question of which para-
digm to use since the OEP is the obvious choice, in the human and social sciences, 
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it must be chosen in a preliminary step. This is clearly the case of psychology where 
the OEP has been used for many years in laboratory studies (Wundt created the 
first experimental psychology laboratory at Leipzig in 1879. His initial training as 
a physiologist probably contributed to the transfer of skills and models to psychol-
ogy). The central theme studied by this laboratory was in fact perception. More 
recently, from the 1960s, cognitive psychology has made extensive use of this OEP 
adding new technological tools in order to study the dynamics of the brain processes 
during information processing operations.
5.4 Characteristics and migrations of the PEO
The well-known OEP has become so dominant that it represents an idealised 
conception of research built around clearly defined options. The main ones, apart 
from the public nature of the investigation procedure, include the permanent 
concern for verification using a device conceived and/or built by the researcher. To 
meet these epistemological requirements, a workplace and clearly defined working 
conditions are necessary. The workplace is the laboratory, isolated from the influ-
ences of the outside world, to prevent unwanted influences - without really know-
ing what they are - from disturbing the network of relations between variables. The 
device used is a reconstruction simplified by means of the “scientific reductionism” 
of potential relations between certain (potentially causal) independent variables 
and (resulting) dependent variables. Validation tools, sometimes statistical, are 
used to check whether or not the links proposed are valid.
In view of the guarantees it offers regarding the objectivity of the conclusions 
and their applicability in real situations, the OEP has been adopted in numerous 
human and social science research studies [5], rarely in its canonical form and 
frequently in forms adapted to the situation being processed. The latter forms may 
be increasingly remote from the basic schema. From an epistemological point of 
view, it is interesting to consider these successive shifts. They highlight the existence 
of a compromise, in other words an attenuation of the generality and rigour of the 
method by considering the specific characteristics of each situation.
5.5 Epistemological functions of the paradigm
In addition to the intrinsic functions of the paradigm, those of information 
processing, Kuhn [6] adds a global, trans-situational function. This author points 
out that the results obtained during its applications to situations of different type 
but of similar architecture (organisation) are indicators of its validity (the general-
ity requirement g is met). Due to scientific progress, all paradigms are superseded 
as soon as they are no longer able to provide answers to the questions raised. A new 
epistemological option and a new paradigm become necessary. Kuhn designated 
this moment of transition “a scientific revolution”. The progress made in scientific 
knowledge is neither linear nor regular; it is built up discontinuously by a series 
of leaps separated by periods of stability, of irregular duration, but which shorten 
according to the degree of progress of science.
6. Cognitive dilemmas
6.1 Opposed characteristics
The most recent paradigmatic leap in the evolution of human sciences is that 
marking the transition from the objective experimental paradigm to the systemic 
Decision Making
8
paradigm. What are the consequences? The study of dynamic and complex situa-
tions using the OEP analysis grid is unable to determine the efficient decision which 
would bring the system to the required state (how to put out the forest fire, for 
example).
Due to the recurrence of difficulties and failures, a more in-depth epistemologi-
cal analysis must be conducted. This could be explained, for example, by the fact 
that the characteristics of the complex and dynamic situation to be analysed (S) and 
those of the tool (paradigm O) used to do so, clearly appear to be contradictory in 
many respects. As regards the structuring units considered: dynamic subsystems 
(S) against variables (O); a problem reconstructed to be operationalised in a labora-
tory isolated from the outside world (O) faced with a real problem observed in 
natural environment (S); non-linear relations (S) translated by linear relations (O); 
dismissal of the temporal perspective (O) although the time of observation and 
evolution of the system is a determining factor for the decisional choice (S). This 
amounts to applying a tool built using properties which are rigorously opposed to 
the situations to which it is applied.
6.2 An epistemological choice and its consequences
Due to another source of malfunction, the scientific reductionism operation 
must be re-examined. In this case, the methodological reductionism will be consid-
ered differently from its ordinary meaning: we will consider it as a methodological 
approach aimed at condensing a real situation to reduce it to its most fundamental 
components. This type of operation, also used for a quite different purpose, has 
been called “eidetic reduction” by the phenomenologists, to shift, using their 
terminology, from the “existence” of things to their “essence”.
Thus, a natural situation (i.e. outside the laboratory) is an instantiation sur-
rounded by a “clutter” of temporal or circumstantial particularisms, which prove 
secondary for those wanting to isolate general information to be used for theorising 
and modelling. Moreover, this reduction also takes a material form when it allows 
researchers to build the device mentioned above in order to select from the flow the 
information which must be kept and then test the information which seems impor-
tant, in particular that used to satisfy the objectivity.
6.3 Cognitive map / heuristic map
The cognitive map, sometimes also referred to as the heuristic map, is a mental 
model or representation that a human individual makes of the arrangement of 
steps, methods or conditions which he/she considers necessary to decide what to do. 
In other words, it is an organised representation of knowledge. It indicates the time 
required to identify a task (about one minute), in forms that are sometimes rather 
basic, it transmits, when necessary, the information to the long-term memory 
which stores it for future reuse.
Like numerous cognitive productions, this map is subject to the heuristic 
approaches identified by Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky [7]. While numerous 
occurrences exist, they all have the same objective: introduce simplicity into a situ-
ation which, due to its complexity, appears to be disconcerting. We may mention 
again the initial lack of understanding conveyed by the term “chaos theory”, direct 
reflection of a cognitive failure. As confirmed subsequently by the research studies 
in cognitive psychology on judgement, as part of the basic need of every human 
being to understand the present world, individuals will perform heuristic reduc-
tions of this complexity which will then be used to produce simplified cognitive 
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maps. However, although the mental representation is simplified, the reality of the 
situation nevertheless remains complex. Applying the simplified mental models to 
the reality of the situation fosters errors of judgement and therefore inappropriate 
decisions. (A very similar approach in the field of perception underlies the develop-
ment of conspiracy “theories”.)
7. Management of globality: counterproductive simplifications
7.1 An essential requirement
In the decision-making concerning the complex situations mentioned in 2.2, the 
decision is more complex than choosing a single action directly. The term “decision-
making” means determining a sequence of actions meeting the characteristics stated 
at the start of this study. Each situation chosen must be considered as a reactive 
systemic globality. Trying to isolate the elements, separate them from the set means 
simultaneously altering the system and fragmenting the relations between ele-
ments. Unlike the device built in the laboratory whose architecture is intangible 
and where only the intensities vary, the complex system is an evolving and reacting 
entity: a forest fire does not have the same characteristics when it has just broken 
out as when it has lasted for several days. The temporal dynamic aspect becomes 
preponderant.. Assessing the potential of a complex system implies being able to 
quantify a global index that expresses its evolutionary power. Entropy represents a 
reference often used although in different forms: quantified when the data allow it 
[8], cognitive in other cases [9].
7.2 Consider the globality: the example of gestalt psychology
How to conceive the processing of globality? A first option mainly consists in 
not breaking it down according to the Cartesian and Newtonian analysis methods, 
which are highly attractive since they have demonstrated their usefulness for the 
construction of numerous highly attractive disciplinary corpuses. The recom-
mended strategy in this case is not to discard them but to examine, when analysis 
tools are concerned, the conditions and benefits of preserving the globality.
The Gestalt Psychology initiated by German researchers working in the 
United States, and pioneered by Lewin (1890–1947), attempted to do so. The 
Gestalt movement does not refer to the laboratory and adopts the principle based 
on the analysis of global entities. These terms designate the situation as such (often 
referred to as the figure) and the informational field in which it is immersed (often 
referred to as the ground). According to this epistemological movement, trying 
to distinguish between the elements is pointless since “the whole is more than 
the sum of its parts”. The whole has its own characteristics (we might be tempted 
to say its own “personality”) which is more than the sum of the elements taken 
individually.
7.3 Dynamisms
Another extremely important property of the Gestalts is their dynamism. This 
can be easily observed by examining the reversible figures widely published in 
magazines, designed in such a way that the figure and the ground can be inter-
changed. It takes a few moments to observe the dynamism of the phenomenon 
which globally and suddenly modifies the nature of what is perceived.
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When attempting to sketch out an epistemology of globality, Lewin, who 
developed the concept of group techniques, strived to study each situation, each 
type of behaviour, inserted in its natural context. One well-known example is that 
of purchasing behaviour. So no isolation and no more or less successful recon-
struction. In his book entitled “Principles of Topological Psychology”, Lewin [10] 
studies social behaviour and is the first one to analyse psychological behaviour. His 
project consists in modelling the analysis approaches used in psychology on those of 
mathematics but mainly of the physics of his time, in other words in terms of forces 
and force resultants. Lewin also introduces the concept of psychological life space 
including space, time and forces as dynamic elements; entities which prepare the 
way for the distribution of dynamic complex systems in human sciences.
8. Structural differences between the object and the tool
8.1 The decision-maker’s locus of control in situation
Psychologists use the term “locus of control” to designate: “the degree to which 
people believe that they, as opposed to external forces (beyond their influence), have 
control over the outcome of events in their lives.”1 In this case, the control concerns the 
choice of the action which would bring the system to the required objective.
8.2 Means underlying the locus of control
What means are available to decision-makers to consider that they can control 
the development of the situation? In actual fact, these decision-makers implicitly 
or clearly perceive that their resources are limited. They are not in a position to use 
a previous professional experience or an apprenticeship since, in most cases, the 
situations to be processed are both complex and infrequent; in human sciences, 
they have in fact given rise to very few conceptualised approaches. In terms of 
decision-making, the only “scientific” data regarding the action choices are deter-
mined based on case studies and generally to analyse errors or malfunctions. In 
such a context, few cognitive resources are assigned to the locus of control, based 
at best on “degrees of belief”, i.e. at best on subjective probabilities. The resulting 
uncertainty experienced has a negative effect on the action choices, especially if the 
stakes are high.
8.3 A transition
To reduce this uncertainty in order to choose the best actions, the decision-
makers will opt for a strategy different from that of collecting ever more informa-
tion. Although the PEO guarantees objectivity, this is at the cost of reducing the 
field of study. In addition, being a typical laboratory paradigm, it does not apply 
to the situations we have qualified as natural. Being unable to determine the action 
required with a sufficient guarantee of validity, the decision-makers will switch 
to type 2 information. They will build their decision using the properties of type 2 
information, in other words giving priority to structuring a set rather than accumu-
lating information (type 1). This emphasis placed on the tool before processing the 
informational context reminds us of the “toolbox” of Gigerenzer’s concepts (“The 
mind as an adaptive toolbox”) [11].
1 Wikipedia
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8.4 Existence and consequences of a paradox
Not all the difficulties have been resolved, however. In view of the difficulties 
arising in the field situations, the verdict of reality suggests the potential existence 
of future obstacles. We will make the assumption, currently only supported by 
observations, that application of this toolbox depends on a cognitive map and that 
the map is a simplified representation of the reality of field data, which remain 
complex.
It is therefore not unreasonable to mention the underlying existence of a paradox 
for the decision-makers. Since [12] they are all scientists, engineers and high-level 
technicians experienced in traditional scientific procedures, they will seek to be 
objective in the decisional choices by applying, naturally one might say, the PEO via 
the cognitive map to data which are above all complex and dynamic. This paradig-
matic tool, imported from the experimental paradigm, too fixist and too simplified 
and which, finally, provides quality (objectivity) but which in these situations 
considerably limits the validity. The PEO proves to be poorly adapted to the charac-
teristics of complex systems.
9. Conclusion
What can be concluded from the decisional inabilities identified in this docu-
ment? We observe firstly the importance of the internal consistency of the para-
digm, in particular that required between the characteristics of the information and 
the tools used to process it. We then note that all subjective references involving 
the personal knowledge and experience of the decision-makers have been carefully 
avoided. The Italian statistician de Finetti (1906–1985) proposes abandoning the 
objective definition of probability without this affecting the quality of the judge-
ments. The method used is that of the odds applied to bets on racecourses. This type 
of quantification known as “subjective probability” is considered as expressing the 
“degrees of belief” which are clearly cognitive.
List of acronyms
DMCS Decision making in complex systems
OEP Objective experimental paradigm
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